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By A. Allan Schmid
Heterodox scholarship at Michigan State University (MSU) was influenced by the
institutional economics of John R. Commons at Wisconsin.  But it was far from
monolithic and had many other sources and originality of its own.  A case can be made
that the center of institutional economics moved across Lake Michigan from Madison to
East Lansing and blossomed in the second half of the 20
th century with such Wisconsin
Ph.D’s as Raleigh Barlowe, Warren Samuels, Allan Schmid, Harry Trebing, and others.
Equally important in making MSU a center of institutional economics were scholars from
other institutional backgrounds such as Paul Strassmann, economic development; Robert
Solo, science and technology; James Shaffer, agricultural marketing and consumer
behavior; Nicholas Mercuro, law and economics; and others.
Commons was in the Wisconsin Department of Economics, but one of his major
disciples and collaborators was Kenneth Parsons of the Department of Agricultural
Economics (Lampman, Baldwin et al. 1993).  This close relationship between the
Wisconsin Departments of Economics and Agricultural Economics was also the case at
MSU.  This mutual stimulation was reflected in the Spartan Group whose social and
intellectual interaction will be noted below.  This paper will concentrate on teaching, but
it will be necessary to explore the research upon which it was based.
i  Teaching of
institutional economics at MSU was notably concerned with content rather that preparing
“horses for courses.”  Some of the faculty wrote books explicitly for the course taught
and others made extensive use of their own articles and others, rather than using standard
texts.
The large number of institutionalists at MSU was not a stable of protégés of an
entrepreneurial superstar, but rather a group of independent scholars in two departments
who nevertheless complemented each other.  Circumstances allow the main actors to
speak for themselves.  If the complementarity of themes and ideas emerges, it is from the
self-described facts and not from the selective interpretation of one author.
Department of Agricultural Economics
The first Wisconsin Ph.D.’s who came to MSU with an institutional bent were
agricultural economists and included Henry Larzalere (Ph.D. 1938) whose major
professor was Asher Hobson.  Larzalere recalls the influence of Commons who retired in
1933.  Upon graduation, Larzalere worked a short time for Wisconsin Governor Phillip
Fox LaFollette who won passage of the nation’s first unemployment compensation act.
Commons had earlier helped LaFollette’s father, Robert, to a number of institutional
innovations.
ii  Larzalere continued the Commons’ tradition of contributing to the
development of new institutions rather than being content to provide an efficiency
apologia for existing private governance structures.  He helped Michigan farmers form
                                                
1 Prepared for the Conference on the History of Heterodox Economics in the 20
th Century, University of
Missouri-Kansas City, October 3, 2002.2
cooperatives.  He taught land economics prior to Barlowe’s arrival in 1948, but primarily
taught agricultural marketing.  One of his undergraduate students was Glenn Johnson (see
below).  Larzalere retired in 1977.
Other Wisconsin graduates included Raleigh Barlowe (Ph.D. 1945) who taught
land economics in the tradition of Wisconsin’s Richard Ely and George Wehrwein;
Garland Wood (1958) who taught economic development; [a complement came from
Cornell in the person of the late Orion (Cherry) Ulrey (Ph.D. 1934) who taught
cooperation and worked abroad (a course in farmer cooperatives was taught as early as
1915 in the Department of Economics by the late Wilbur Hedrick) and George Motts who
was at MSU from 1931 to 1960 and organized a horticultural auction to bring together
small producers and retail stores;]
iii the late Glynn McBride (Ph.D. 1954) working in
marketing; and Dan Sturt (Ph.D. 1954) who organized a program in agricultural labor.
Colletta Moser, Ph.D. 1971 from Wisconsin’s Department of Economics taught an
undergraduate course “Women and Work” and is an extension specialist in farm labor
and community development.  She was active in AAUP on campus.  Moser was co-
author with her former major professor of a text in labor economics (Reynolds, Masters
et al. 1998).
Farm co-ops are like labor unions in the sense that they represent collective action
that allows atomistic individuals to countervail against the market power of employers
and farm input suppliers and output processors.  Ulrey initiated the MSU Employees
Credit Union in 1934 and served as its president for eight years.  He also helped organize
student housing cooperatives at MSU, and Ulrey House was named after him.  Ulrey was
an outspoken social critic in the tradition of Veblen, which made him persona non grata
to the Chair of the MSU Board of Trustees who represented a conservative farm
organization.
Raleigh Barlowe first worked for the Division of Land Economics, Bureau of
Agricultural Economics of the U.S. Department of Agriculture in the field and in
Washington.  At the end of WW II (1948) he moved to MSU in a faculty position paid
half by the university and half by the government, a common U.S.D.A. arrangement at
that time to encourage collaborative research.  He taught land economics.  Barlowe also
offered a special problems course in institutional economics in 1956 featuring the works
of Veblen, Commons, J.M. Clark, Ayres, and Hamilton.  Barlowe wrote a text for his
undergraduate land economics course entitled, Land Resource Economics: The
Economics of Real Property, first published in 1958 and the second edition in 1972
(Barlowe 1972).  He also taught ‘Advanced Land Economics’ as well as “Land Problems
and Policies” at the graduate level.  Land policy in this case also included property rights
in water and other natural resources.  Agricultural economists have investigated land
tenure institutions going back to the pioneering work of Richard Ely’s, Property and
Contract (1914).
A. Allan Schmid filled the position opened in Agricultural Economics when
Barlowe moved to the Department of Resource Development at MSU in 1959. Schmid
(Ph.D. 1959) went to Wisconsin because of the influence of Wisconsin grads Don Kanel
and Kris Kristjanson who were on the faculty of agricultural economics at the University
of Nebraska.  He was also influenced by Clyde Mitchell, an iconoclastic researcher of
farm policy who later left Nebraska under pressure from the state’s conservative element.
It was in Mitchell’s course that Schmid was introduced to the thinking of Elmer Davis,3
Charles M. Hardin, Jerome Frank, J. K. Galbraith, and Gunnar Myrdal among others.
Schmid’s major professor in Madison was Ray Penn.  He was also influenced by Kenneth
Parsons as well as Robert Clodius and Willard (Fritz) Mueller in industrial organization.
He took courses from Martin Glaeser in public utilities, Selig Perlman in communism and
socialism, Walter Morton in monetary policy, Edwin Witte in government and business
(with Warren Samuels as his teaching assistant), W.R. Parks (political scientist) in
government and agriculture, Karl Bogholt in the philosophy of John Dewey, and Jacob
Beuscher in the Law School.  Schmid’s class notes from Perlman’s course have been
published (Schmid 1999).
Schmid inherited Barlowe’s “Advanced Land Economics” in 1962 (AEC 810).
He asked why natural resources were treated as a special case in economics.  Changes in
land use were often non-marginal in character, which did not fit neoclassical theory very
well.  What characteristics did they have that made collective action particularly
important?  Schmid noted that high exclusion costs and non-rivalry in consumption
(marginal cost of another user = zero) were typical in environmental products.  So he
began to look at these features in other goods and began to focus the course on a series of
goods characteristics including economies of scale, information and transaction costs, and
etc.  These were illustrated with a wide variety of goods and services including but not
limited to natural resources.  Thus, the title of the course changed to “Economics of
Public Choice” in 1973 and finally “Institutional and Behavioral Economics” in 1992.
His book, Property, Power and Public Choice (Schmid 1978) (second edition 1987) is
used in the course.
While retaining his applied interest in resource economics, Schmid devotes
himself to developing institutional economics theory.  He is currently working on a book
manuscript with the objective of developing an integrated conceptual framework useful
for investigation of formal law as well as informal custom, and for contrasting the
performance impact of alternative institutions as well as understanding the process of
institutional change (evolution).
Schmid also taught an undergraduate version of institutional economics applied to
problems of state and local government entitled “Community Economics.”  Students
probably most remember the fundamental economic interdependencies illustrated by
Isaiah Berlin’s apt phrase, “Freedom for the pike is death for the minnow.”
The courses emphasized that human interdependence emanated from a range of
inherent features of goods that were the basis of why one person’s behavior affected
others.  It was formal and informal institutions that sorted out who had what opportunities
and thus economic performance in terms of who gets what.  Instead of the structure,
conduct, performance framework of industrial organization, Schmid made the character
(situation) of the good being produced explicit in a framework of Situation, Structure and
Performance.  Structure included many more institutional variables than market structure.
The market is not a single entity, but rather alternative detailed market rules matter.  The
market and the law unavoidably form a nexus rather than being separate alternatives.
Here the influence of Warren Samuels is evident as expressed in his article, “The Legal-
Economic Nexus” (Samuels 1989).
Schmid also converted the AEC 811 “Land Problems and Policies” grad course
first into “Property, Tenure and Land Policy” and then to a more general “Public Program
Analysis” (benefit-cost) course taught between 1962 and 1991.  He wrote a book for the4
course entitled Benefit-Cost Analysis: A Political Economy Approach (Schmid 1989).
Political economy meant that the methodology addressed how political judgments of
Congress and administrators could be systematically incorporated into the ranking of
publicly financed projects and regulation.  This is in contrast to the more usual welfare
economics stance that the analyst can independently establish what is efficient.  Schmid
questioned the assumption that distribution and production could be separated.
Efficiency is not a single unique thing, but is derived from collective judgments of whose
interests count.  Schmid conceived of a regulatory budget and incorporated both
regulations and spending projects into an integrated framework that was incorporated into
a centralized review of regulations by the Systems Analysis Group (Corps of Engineers)
of the Office of the Secretary of the Army and the Office of Management and Budget.
Schmid spent 1968-69 with the Systems Analysis Group whose staff raised too many
questions and was later abolished by Congress.  See
<htttp://www.thecre.com/ombpapers/>
 Schmid’s courses can be seen on the web at <http://msu.edu/course/aec/810/htm>
and <http://msu.edu/course/prm/201/htm>.  In his graduate course, he uses the Socratic
method and borrowed the idea of the Journal File from Shaffer (see below).  He
maintains an institutional economics web page with working papers and institutional
economics course outlines at various universities at
http://www.msu.edu/user/schmid/instecon.htm
James D. Shaffer received his PhD. from the Department of Agricultural Economics at
MSU in 1953.  He evolved a theme of study he referred to as “institutions, behavior and
performance.”  In Shaffer’s own words:
“My Bachelors was in Political Science. I intended to go to law school and was admitted
to the University of Michigan. For family reasons I decided to delay law school and
started graduate work at MSU in Economics, thinking that law and economics were
complementary.  I had read enough even at that stage to believe it was a mistake to
separate law, political science and economics.  My graduate work was standard for that
time with fields in trade, fiscal policy, theory, and agricultural economics.  Along the way
I managed to include several good courses in psychology.  There were no courses
identified as institutional economics although some courses in Industrial Organization
had institutional economics content.  My Ph.D. research involved developing methods for
obtaining and using a flow of information about consumer food purchases to assist firms
and farm groups to better target markets. From that I developed a strong interest in
consumer behavior. I continued work on the large, well-funded project for several years
after joining the faculty at MSU.
My fifty-year career at Michigan State focused on three areas, the economic
performance of agricultural markets, agricultural and rural policy, and economic
development of poor countries.
iv  The work I did was at a very practical level.  My early
interest in development was fanned by a program I participated in during the summer of
1947 studying the problems of economic reconstruction following WW II at several
universities in Europe.  Faced with the real problems in these areas it was obvious that
the simplified models of economics were inadequate.  More realistic ideas about
behavior, organization, and constraints had to be used.  As I went along I found ideas of
those identified as institutional economists as well as many others who were simply5
interested in dealing with practical problems useful.
Fortunately for me I developed both a personal and professional relationship with
Al Schmid and Warren Samuels.  We spent many years exchanging ideas about
economics and many other things.  When the Spartan Group was meeting I participated
bringing practical ideas and skepticism to the discussions while learning from the others’
large output of scholarly work that explored concepts in institutional economics.
My first venture in teaching a graduate course dealt with consumer behavior.  In
the course we explored ideas and literature about perception, learning, decision-making
for individuals and organizations (including households), culture, as well as studies of
consumer behavior done by businesses and others and asking about the implications of
these ideas and findings for practical marketing, economic policy and the way we think
about economics as a field of study.  It was not necessary to spend much time discussing
the utility of the concept of maximizing utility as a description of consumer behavior.
As the scope of my research and extension expanded more into economic
development and policy, and as I was influenced by the work of my colleagues, the
course evolved and I managed to get it renamed “Institutions, Behavior and
Performance.” (At the students’ suggestion I tried “Shaffer’s Course,” but institutional
rigidities prohibited it.)  The course was a seminar and workshop.  [Note: His question
and discussion method was modeled after a suggestion of the psychologist, Carl Rogers,
on “student centered teaching” (Rogers 1951).]  Students were asked to develop what I
called a Journal File [following a suggestion of C. Wright Mills in his Appendix on “On
Intellectual Craftsmanship” (Mills 1959)].  In the Journal File students were encouraged
to write themselves out developing ideas contributing to their own framework (paradigm)
for understanding political economics and doing practical policy analysis.  They were
encouraged to look at a political economy as an evolutionary process, to consider
institutions as formal and informal rules of political and economic life which constrain
and facilitate behavior of participants, to consider behavior under uncertainty about
situations, preferences and consequences of actions, and consider performance as
outcomes which are payoffs for different participants, which in turn influences future
institutions and behavior.  The course was offered for about 25 years from the mid 1960’s
through 1991.
Most of what I wrote and used in the course was written for the course or as
reports associated with research projects or workshops.  Among my published articles
used in the course were:  “On Institutional Obsolescence and Innovation (Shaffer 1969).”
and “On the Structure of Power in the United States Political Economy (Shaffer 1975).”
His theoretical framework was laid out in “Food System Organization and Performance:
Toward A Conceptual Framework. (Shaffer 1980).
 Institutional economists tend to be actively involved in creating new institutions.
Shaffer followed this tradition and reports, “I was Chair of the Michigan Railroad
Advisory Council for several years while the problem of rail abandonment was a hot
topic.  I found a record of the Council meeting in 1976.  As I recall the Council met for
several years. Prior to the Council I served on an advisory committee dealing with rail
problems in Michigan.  They were both advisory to the Highway Department.  Again I
became involved because I had held extension sponsored workshops dealing with rail
abandonment and rural development and was asked to join these advisory groups.”6
Shaffer found an interested audience among fruit growers who were developing
associations for collective action.  The associations promoted enactment of the Michigan
Agricultural Marketing Act that gave accredited cooperative association exclusive
bargaining authority with processors.  The Act was challenged in the Michigan and U.S.
Supreme Courts (Michigan Canners and Freezers Assoc. vs. Agricultural Marketing and
Bargaining Board, 467 U.S. 461, 104 S.Ct. 2518).  This was a classic case of property
rights in a high exclusion cost good.  The price negotiated by members would also be
available to non-members who had not borne any of the organizing costs.  The free-riding
non-members reduced the effectiveness of the collective bargaining as is the case in labor
negotiations as well.  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Act could not “interfere with
a producer’s freedom to choose whether to bring his products to market himself or to sell
them through a producers’ cooperative association.”  This is another example of
“Freedom for the pike is death for the minnow.”  Shaffer describes his involvement, “The
Michigan Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act was passed in 1972.  I was the first
Chairman of the Board established by the act, probably starting in late 1972 or ’73 and
continued for about 10 years.  The Michigan House and Senate passed a joint resolution
saying nice things about my contribution to Michigan Agriculture in 1984, which I recall
was a year after I quit as Chair.  Contrary to accusations, I did not write the Bill.  I did do
quite a bit of extension work prior to the legislation discussing the possibility of
legislation and some of the things to be considered.  As I recall, I also had an opportunity
to comment on an early draft, but I was not responsible for drafting the legislation.  The
legislation had some problems which might have been avoided had I had the opportunity
to write the legislation. During this period I was active in national meetings dealing with
marketing orders and agreements and in farmer bargaining legislation and the activities of
these associations.”
Work questioning the value of the advertising of farm products caused a strong
reaction from certain vested interests.  “The executive director of the Michigan Press
Association demanded that I be dismissed because anyone who would raise such
questions must be at least a misinformed economist if not a communist.  The Dean, I was
told, was a strong defender of his faculty in this case.”
While Shaffer was on sabbatical leave in 1988, Schmid taught his course and
emphasized even more the behavioral and cognitive dimensions that then fed back into
Schmid’s own course.  Shaffer emphasized that behavior was learned and reinforced by
feedback from the environment.  His attention to behavioral economics predated the
current growing interest represented by faculty positions in the subject at Harvard and
MIT.  Shaffer’s course was always changing as he added new materials from his wide
reading each year. http://www.msu.edu/user/schmid/shaffer-809.htm
He searched for new institutions to solve the chronic low incomes and oversupply
in agriculture.  He came up with the idea of universal forward contracts wherein the price
would be known before the crops were planted (Shaffer 1990). Shaffer was named a
Fellow of the American Agricultural Economics Association and also honored with a
special retrospective session at its annual meetings in 2000. At the time of his retirement
in 1997 he presented his lifetime musings in a departmental seminar with the subtitle
“Observations From Over The Hill.”  http://www.msu.edu/user/schmid/shaffer2.htm
Shaffer as much as anyone combined ideas and action, university and government.7
John Staatz (MSU Ph.D 1984, student of Shaffer) has made a contribution to the theory
of cooperatives (Staatz 1987) (Staatz 1989).  He is co-director of the Food Security
Project and played a major role in developing a market information system in Mali.  He
co-teaches a graduate seminar in economic development (Eicher and Staatz 1990).  He
also teaches a professional practice course developing skills in applied economic
analysis.  He and Roy Black offered a graduate course in “Information Economics” for
the first time in 2001.
Others.
Agricultural economics at MSU until 1949 was a section within the Department
of Economics, College of Arts and Science (Hill 1972).  The section was lead by Clifford
Hardin who later became Secretary of Agriculture.  Agricultural economists in the
Economics Department averaged about ten between 1927 and 1946.
v  The number had
grown to 19 in 1949.
vi  It was then separated and combined with the Department of Farm
Management (founded in 1928) to become the Department of Agricultural Economics in
the College of Agriculture.  The first chair was the late Thomas Cowden.  Subsequent
chairs such as the late Larry Boger, Harold Riley, Larry Connor, Les Manderscheid, and
Larry Hamm explicitly strove to maintain pluralism in the Department.  Several
departmental planning documents point toward achieving racial, gender, and intellectual
diversity.
vii  Warren Samuels suggests that a part of the answer to the question of why
institutional economics grew at MSU is that “hiring of specialists who happened to be
heterodox, when specialists often were antagonistic to conservative mainstream
economics, and when specialized fields were haven for maverick, deviant and dissident
folks.”  The scholars mentioned below were not necessarily maverick, deviant dissidents,
but were arguably sympathetic and complementary to diverse points of view, if not
explicitly institutionalist.
The early intellectual leaders in the Department of Agricultural Economics
believed that a broad training was important for applied analysts.  The late Lawrence
Witt, a Wisconsin undergraduate and master’s student (Ph.D., Iowa State 1941), came to
MSU in 1947 when agricultural economics was a part of the Department of Economics.
When the Agricultural Economics Department was formed, he taught a graduate level
“Introduction to Agricultural Economics” that exposed students to different schools of
thought and an understanding of the major institutions of agriculture.
viii  This included
links among land grant university research, extension, and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture programs.  Ph.D. students in agricultural economics were required to pass a
field exam in “General Agricultural Economics” as well as their major and minor fields
and economic theory in the Department of Economics.  The preparation of applied
economists at MSU included much more than general equilibrium economic theory.  It
added marketing (which is more than industrial organization), management, and policy
(institutions).  This facilitated a pluralistic approach to economics.
ix  Some regarded this
as a strength of MSU grads and others a weakness.  The general field exam was abolished
in 1998.  Some few other departments copied the MSU general field requirement, but it
was never widespread as specialization proved more popular.
Witt’s own career is representative of the kind of applied work that he wanted
MSU students to be able to do.  He was advisor to George McGovern in the Kennedy
White House and helped develop the Food for Peace Program.  He served as consultant to8
the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, the Agricultural Colleges
of Colombia, the University of Ankara, Turkey, the Economic Research Service of the
USDA, Committee for Economic Development, and the Inter-American Bank.  Witt,
Glenn Johnson and others set the department on a path of international service.
International commitments were possible in the MSU environment guided by the world
vision of President John Hannah.  Many other departments in the nation needed special
permission to travel out of state, let alone abroad.  Larry Hamm offers the hypothesis that
the existence of an internationally oriented (and oligopolistic) auto industry in the state
provided both a worldview (and resources) from which the department and university
benefited.
x
Glenn L. Johnson (Chicago 1949) with his Chicago background was one of the
national leaders in developing agricultural production economics.  At the same time that
he emphasized micro-theory, he understood that farm management was multi-disciplinary
and not simply sub-field of economics (Johnson, Halter et al. 1961) (Johnson 1997).
xi  He
received a M.Sc. in economics in 1942 from MSU and recalls the lack of mathematics
and statistics in course offerings.  But, there was breadth in those interested in public
policy such as Henry Larzalere, Herman Wyngarden, Everett Hagen (Hagen 1962), and
Harald S. Patten “author of Grain Growers’ Cooperation in Western Canada, [who]
served as professor of economics until his death in 1945, although he was in Washington
during many of his sixteen years to assist governmental agencies concerned with
depression recovery and war mobilization Kuhn 1955, 380.”
xii  Johnson’s first job was in
Washington working with O.C. Stine, a Wisconsin graduate, in the Bureau of
Agricultural Economics, U.S.D.A.
Johnson, Witt and Hathaway were in fundamental agreement on the breadth of the
agricultural economics Ph.D. requirements.  Johnson taught the graduate “Research
Methodology” course using his book, Research Methodology for Economists: Philosophy
and Practice (Johnson 1986). He placed pragmatism on an equal footing with other
philosophies guiding inquiry.  The complementarity of institutionalists at MSU is
illustrated by Warren Samuels’ chapter on methodology in Johnson’s festschrift volume
(Samuels 1997). Johnson often referred to his appreciation for his teacher, Frank
Knight.
xiii  Johnson spent a sabbatical studying philosophical value theory at the
University of Cambridge (Johnson and Zerby 1973).  He was active in his local Lutheran
Church and contributed to its exploration of the relationship of science and religion.
Among many international activities, Johnson headed a major rural development
project in Nigeria in the 1960’s.  The work continued with the Consortium for the Study
of Nigerian Rural Development, 1969-85.  He also headed a Korean Agricultural Sector
Analysis project running simulations of the consequences of alternative policies, 1971-
85.  He distinguishes between econometric models and simulations, arguing for the
policy utility of the latter.
In his production economics research and teaching, Johnson made a major
contribution to the theory of investment and disinvestments.  He developed the idea of
“fixed assets” to explain why agriculture was in a constant state of disequilibrium
(Johnson 1962) and (Schmid 1997) Chapter 5.  He developed this idea prior to
Williamson’s analysis of specific assets (Williamson 1975). Whereas Williamson used
the idea of specific assets (and transactions costs) to show that firms would choose an
efficient form of private governance, Johnson emphasized that farmers would keep on9
producing even when returns did not cover acquisition prices as long as the marginal
value product was greater than variable costs plus salvage value of capital assets.  These
assets could be specific to the production of a particular farm product or to the
agricultural industry (rather than to a particular set of transacting parties) and became
fixed in production (did not exit) under the above conditions.  So while Williamson’s
theory gave a rationale for the best of all possible worlds, Johnson saw a troublesome
“overproduction trap (Johnson 1986).” Williamson argued that if left alone, firms would
negotiate private arrangements that would protect against losses to specific assets caused
by the opportunistic behavior of trading partners.  Johnson argued that without collective
action, farm firms making their best choices at the margin could not escape continuing
asset losses as each wave of technological change became fixed in the agricultural sector.
Institutional, human, and resource changes could cause the same problem.  “Decisions by
consenting individuals will not necessarily produce the best of all possible results in the
face of transaction costs (imperfect information).”  Market clearance brings huge and
painful losses.  Johnson’s point is somewhat like Keynes’ idea of an equilibrium at less
than full employment (less than that necessary to avoid widespread and chronic asset
losses).  He agreed with Arrow, “Judging the desirability of what the market does is not
within the domain of economic theory.  That judgment has to come from an
understanding of the interdependence of perspectives from markets, science, government
and religion.”
xiv  This is indeed a theme consistent with institutionalist thought.
Johnson was a Fellow of the American Agricultural Economics Association and a
past president of the International Association of Agricultural Economists.  Johnson
retired in 1988.
The Department of Agricultural Economics was pre-eminent in the field of
agricultural policy, and faculty included Dale Hathaway (DPA Harvard 1952) whose
seminal work, Government and Agriculture, was used in his graduate course (Hathaway
1963).  Hathaway had a command of data on the agricultural economy like no other
(somewhat in the tradition of Wesley Mitchell and Simon Kuznets).  He was on the staff
of the Council of Economic Advisors.  In many roles, he advised the government on trade
policy.  Hathaway today is director of the National Center for Food and Agricultural
Policy, once a part of Resources for the Future and currently independent.  Edward
Rossmiller, a former MSU grad and faculty member, was also one-time director of the
Center and on the staff of the FAO in Rome.
Several other members of the Dept. of Agricultural Economics were sympathetic
to institutional economics and were part of its community of interest.  James Bonnen
(Harvard 1964) specialized in agricultural policy and data and was a Fellow of the
American Agricultural Economics Association, American Association for the
Advancement of Science, and the American Statistical Association.  He wrote definitive
articles on science policy, research institutions and organizations of agriculture (Bonnen
1988) (Bonnen 1987).  Bonnen was a member of the President’s Advisory Commission
on Rural Poverty whose 1967 landmark report was entitled The People Left Behind.  He
was Senior Staff Economist, President’s Council of Economic Advisors, 1963-65, and
was Executive Director, The President’s Reorganization Project for the Federal Statistical
System 1978-79.  He joined the MSU faculty in 1954 and retired in 1996.
Others whose work was (and is) complementary to institutionalist themes were
Eileen van Ravenswaay (Ph.D Carnegie-Mellon, 1980) working in ecological economics10
and food safety (van Ravenswaay 2000), Sandra Batie (University of Washington 1967)
(Batie and Ervin 2001) working in environmental economics and agricultural policy,
Lindon Robison (Texas A&M 1975) working on social capital (Robison and Schmid
1994), David Schweikhardt (MSU, 1989) a student of Bonnen’s who teaches AEC 817
“Political Economy of Agricultural and Trade Policy” (Schweikhardt and Browne 2001)
(Bonnen and Schweikhardt 1998), Lynn Harvey an extension specialist in public finance
and state and local government (Harvey 1994) and a Ph.D. (1989) student of Shaffer,
Patricia Norris (Virginia Polytechnic Institute1988) in resource economics, Christopher
Peterson in strategic management,
xv and Larry Hamm, a Wisconsin masters student,
working in dairy marketing and policy, a Ph.D. (1981) student of Shaffer. Hamm was
department chair from 1990-2002.
The Department was a leader in researching the development of agriculture in
Africa and elsewhere.  Carl Eicher followed Johnson as director of the Economic
Development Institute in Nigeria and developed an internationally recognized program in
Africa and agricultural research institutions (Eicher 1982).  Eicher led an U.S. Agency for
International Development funded Alternative Rural Development Strategies Project that
evolved into the Food Security project.  This 15 year-old project is directed by Michael
Weber (MSU Ph.D. 1976) (Jayne, Yamano et al. 2001) and John Staatz noted above.
Many Ph.D. students who had been in the Peace Corps came to MSU to study economic
development and appreciated institutionalist courses.
Department of Economics
Two institutional economists in MSU’s Department of Economics played key roles in the
formation and leadership of the Association for Evolutionary Economics (AFEE).  Harry
Trebing was a member of the Wardman group that founded the Association and he later
served as its president.  Warren Samuels was the editor of the Association’s journal, The
Journal of Economic Issues (JEI) from 1971-1981.  Both men received the Association’s
Veblen-Commons Award.  Samuels was also president of the Association for Social
Economics.
Before relating the work of Trebing and Samuels, the foundation of the modern
Department of Economics can be noted.  Wilbur O. Hedrick after some training in
Europe became assistant professor of history and political economy in 1893 teaching
economics, American constitutional history, English history, civil government, logic,
psychology, and ethics (Kuhn 1955) 183.  Hedrick founded a cooperative bookstore in
1897 and helped form cooperative student housing (357).  Sociology and economics were
separated in 1916.  Economics was transformed from a minor field to a major in 1922
during the college presidency of David Friday, “an economist of national repute who
possessed a special competence in agricultural economics (Kuhn 1955) 278-81.”
xvi  The
number of courses increased and the faculty doubled from three to six.  Michigan
Agricultural College graduated its first Ph.D. in 1925.  “Sociology was the eighth
department in the College and the first in liberal arts to receive authority to confer the
Ph.D.; economics and education followed shortly (296).”  Economics at MSU like at11
other American universities began embedded in social sciences broadly considered and
moved toward specialization (Parrish 1967).
Harry M. Trebing is one of the country’s foremost specialists in public utility
regulation.  His contributions are assessed in (Samuels and Miller 2002).   In Trebing’s
own words, “I was introduced to institutional economics at the University of Maryland
(MA, Economics, 1952) by Allan G. Gruchy, Dudley Dillard, and Eli Clemens.  I
continued my studies in institutionalism at the University of Wisconsin (Ph.D.
economics, 1958), working with Martin G. Glaeser, Edwin E. Witte, and Selig Perlman.
I was president of the John R. Commons Club at Wisconsin, and we invited a number of
distinguished institutionalists to come to the campus. (These included such people as
Rexford G. Tugwell, et al. The only person who declined our invitation was J.M. Clark,
who stated that he was not an institutionalist!)
I worked as a member of the original Wardman Group, which created AFEE. We
worked on the bylaws and sought to define the concept of evolutionary economics to
embrace institutionalism. As Secretary-Treasurer of AFEE, I worked closely with Ben
Seligman while he was Editor of the JEI.  In addition, I was the person who suggested
that AFEE establish the annual Veblen-Commons Award.
My teaching focused on the industrial organization sequence where duties were
shared with Walter Adams. I had primary responsibility for Econ 821C “Economics of
Public Utility Regulation”, and I taught Econ 821A “Industrial Organization Theory” on
an as-needed basis. Walter taught 821B “Anti-Trust.” I also taught the undergraduate
equivalent of these courses. The themes that I stressed involved the interrelationship
between market structure, corporate behavior and strategies, and the strengths and
weaknesses of government attempts at regulation (Trebing 1998). The dimensions of
market failure and market power were also unifying themes (Trebing 2001) (Trebing
2001).  I taught these courses over the period 1966-1991.
At the same time, I founded the Institute of Public Utilities at MSU and served as
its first Director; I also served as Administrator of all of the educational programs for the
state and federal public utility regulatory agencies. The latter involved close collaboration
with the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissions. Designing programs
and conferences for NARUC and the Institute, as well as for individual state utility
commissions, permitted me to integrate economics, law, and technological change into a
coherent, institutionalist framework. Between 8,000 and 10,000 federal, state, and foreign
regulators attended these programs and conferences during my tenure. They included
commissioners, attorneys general, engineers, statisticians, and economic analysts.
Foreign representatives included regulators from diverse regulatory climates, including
Japan, Taiwan, Spain, South America, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East.
Since my retirement in 1992, I have continued as a Professor Emeritus of
Economics and Senior Fellow with the Institute of Public Utilities. I write and lecture on
different topics pertaining to the problems faced by public utility industries in a changing
climate. My principal focus is on the shortcomings of deregulation, and the superiority of
the institutionalist approach to the neoclassical approach in examining the consequences
of deregulation.”  Trebing continues to render public service, including being a member
of the Michigan Utility Consumer Participation Board.12
Trebing in his remarks above mentions his colleague Walter Adams, one of the
nation’s preeminent scholars of industrial organization that has always been a
complementary theme to institutional economics (Adams and Brock 2001) and (Adams
and Brock 1991).  Adams (Yale 1947) was well aware of the interrelationship between
economic and political power (Adams and Brock 1999).  Adams came to MSU in 1947
where he died in 1998.  Another IO person who was once on the MSU faculty was Joel
Dirlam (Dirlam and Kahn 1970).  Another in the same vein in agricultural economics was
Ronald Cotterill (Wisconsin 1977) who moved to the University of Connecticut in 1981
and established The Food Marketing Policy Center.
<http://www.sp.uconn.edu/~cotteril/FMktC1.html
Warren J. Samuels claims that he has enjoyed doing economics so much that he
hesitates to refer to it as work or a career, “so much for the marginal disutility of labor.”
His institutional credentials run deep.  As an undergraduate at the University of Miami,
he studied with A. J. Noetzel, one of J. R. Commons last doctoral students.  This had
something to do with Samuels going to Wisconsin for his Ph.D. awarded in 1957.  He
states, “I was much influenced by Edwin Witte’s down-to-earth but deep approach to the
economic role of government; Harold Groves’s philosophical approach to questions of
public finance; Selig Perlman’s perceptive and personal approach to questions of
capitalism, socialism, and social reform; Walter A. Morton’s direct, non-ideological, and
even somewhat cynical approach to questions of theory and policy; and Martin Glaeser’s
and Kenneth Parsons’s diverse approaches to Commons (Samuels 1995).”
Samuels wrote the following about what institutionalism meant to him and is
included here because it sums up what many Spartan institutionalists could embrace
(Samuels 1995):
1.  A willingness to dissent and to proceed differently and perhaps alone.
2.  An evolutionary and holistic conception of the economy.
3.  A matter-of-fact, rather than a metaphysical teleological, orthodox, and/or
doctrinaire, approach to doing economics, while appreciating the socially
constructed nature of putative facts.
4.  The centrality of the problem of the organization and control of the economic
system and therein the crucial importance of the human belief system,
selective perception, hypocrisy, and the legal-economic nexus.
5.  The recognition of the hermeneutic character of language and belief, including
the importance of interpretation in contrast with absolutist claims of fact and
truth.
6.  Social constructivism and the importance of the complex processes of
working things out.
7.  The importance of institutions in generating economic performance,
especially of legal institutions informing and channeling the operation of
markets.
8.  The serious limits of the neoclassical strategy of seeking to produce unique
determinate optimum equilibrium solutions.
9.  The importance of technology concerning substance, consequences, and
interrelations with social structure and process.13
Samuels’ research and teaching focused on the history of economic thought and the
economic role of government.  His history of economic thought course taught students to
“think in terms of multiple paradigms or different schools…(Samuels 1996) 39.”  He
assembled a large private library of 16,000 works in history of thought and other topics of
interest.  For 21 years he has published an annual series of Research in the History of
Economic Thought and Methodology and has co-edited with Malcolm Rutherford two
collections of the work of Commons and a ten-volume collection of institutional
economics.
In his grad course “Economic Role of Government” (which might have been titled
law and economics), he challenged students by arguing that “the idea of laissez faire has
almost no analytical or policy-analysis value” and “The idea of an autonomous optimally
function economic system is purely a conceptual (and ideological/metaphysical construct
(Samuels 1996) (40).”  In addition to history of thought and the role of government
Samuels taught public expenditure theory, about two-thirds undergraduate and one-third
grad and macroeconomics for MBA students (1991-97).  He also taught from time to
time courses in comparative systems, radical political economy and public utility
economics substituting for Harry Trebing.  After his retirement in 1998, he has returned
each fall to teach EC 819 “Economic Role of Government.”
http://www.msu.edu/user/schmid/samuels.htm
One of Samuels’ canonical ideas was that cost is not a natural phenomenon, but
rather socially constructed by the institutions that make one individual or group’s
interests a cost to another.  This theme was elaborated in a chapter (Samuels and Schmid
1997) entitled, “Cost As A Concept in Economics.”  Samuels with Geoffrey Hodgson
and Marc Tool edited a two-volume Elgar Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary
Economics (Hodgson, Samuels et al. 1994).  Samuels’ own collected works up to 1992
were reprinted by Macmillan and New York University Press in five volumes (Samuels
1992).
Samuels was a leader in the founding and operation of both History of Political
Economy and the History of Economics Society.  He was president of the Association for
Social Economics and served on the editorial board of many journals.
The next generation of economics professors who taught history of thought at
MSU is represented by Jeff Biddle.  Biddle has written a number of articles on Commons
and Mitchell among others (Biddle 1990) (Biddle 1999).
Robert A. Solo contributed to institutional thought topics ranging from macroeconomics,
methodology, and organizational behavior to science policy.  He earned his Ph.D from
Cornell in 1954 and was a faculty member at several universities before coming to MSU
in 1966.  His career themes in his own words:
“1. Critique and development of Keynesian Expenditure Theory and Policy:  In
1941, I wrote a masters dissertation at American University as a novel analysis and
critique of the theory and practice of Keynesian control of aggregate spending and
developed and proposed basic new policies to achieve the requisite control without
acquiring the burden of an interest-bearing public debt.  The argument was reiterated in
various of my publications but specifically “A Modest Proposal for a New Technique of
Non-Diversionary Public Spending (Solo 1994).”  (Note: Solo shared this interest in
zero-interest public debt with his colleague Allan Schmid (Schmid 1984).)14
2. An epistemological explanation and critique of the self conceptualizations,
aims, rules and constraints that constitute the framework of thought, theory and method
in economic thought and practice in relation to the philosophy of science:  In 1947, I
wrote an abortive doctoral dissertation titled, Essence, Evaluation and Social Technology
at the London School of Economics asserting that the grand theories, generalizations or
laws of economics and of the other social sciences are necessarily of the order of
‘essences’ whose credibility (or truth) cannot be falsified by a specific failure of
prediction as allegedly the case with physics, but rather than economics should be
considered a social technology where the credibility of empirical statement must rest on
time-variable judgments of evidence pro and con, and where value statements are
inescapable and must be acknowledged and accommodated to.  It argues that the
mathematization of the language of economics in imitation of physics has been a wrong
turning for the discipline.  My supervisor (Lionel Robbins) was violently of another
opinion.  An abbreviated but further developed version of this thesis was published as
The Philosophy of Science and Economics (Solo 1991). (Note: Solo was caught between
the conflicting views of co-supervisors Robbins and Karl Popper, and the thesis was
never accepted.)
3. Explanation, critical analysis and evaluation or organization, of policy and of
practice in ‘pure’ (academic) science, research and development, and the promotion of
technological advance.  In sum, I created and introduced into economic discourse, at
least in the United States, an economics of science, R & D and technological advance
with these understood as socio-economic-political entities and phenomena.  In 1954, I
wrote a doctoral dissertation at Cornell University on the establishment during World
War I of a synthetic rubber industry in the United States, under governmental aegis,
going back to the scientific roots and carried through to the sale of the plants to private
enterprise (Solo 1954).
4. Explained the multi-faceted formation of ideologies and their evolution and
transformation as context and determinant of individual choice and organizational
behavior and, with reference to the work of Michel Foucault, Thomas Kuhn and Jean
Piaget, introduced cognitive structure as a sometimes critical variable in the analysis of
economic events and phenomena.
I don’t remember the titles of special courses or seminars that I offered.  But in
general, I taught under the regular course titles, Industrial Organization, Comparative
Systems, Public Finance, and Economic Development, but for every course I wrote my
own text book and taught as I thought, which was always heterodox.  When I taught price
theory, for example, I used my own still unpublished 335 page book titled Price Theory
in Perspective as both a development of and a challenge to neo-classical thought.
But I did, for a time, achieve one curriculum change that indeed made space for
the development of another order of heterodox thought.  I introduced a new field of
studies offered jointly by the Department of Economics and the Department of
Management titled “Organization and Control in the Political Economy” taking into
account the political/market interface, but also and especially geared to understanding
massive modern corporate organization as the key agent in the modern economy, in
contrast to the economic man of neoclassical theory.  As a primary text for the new field
of study I published The Political Authority and the Market System (Solo 1974).”15
Solo had earlier published Economic Organization and Social Systems (Solo
1967) and reprinted in 2002.  He felt that these works together “can serve as a new
paradigm replacing neoclassical economics.”  Solo, like many institutionalists, gave
attention to behavioral economics as evidenced by a chapter entitled, “Economic
Revolution as a Revolution in Cognition” in the aforementioned book.  Solo retired in
1992 and continues to write.
W. Paul Strassmann is best known for his work on entrepreneurship and technology in
manufacturing and technology (Strassmann 1968) (Strassmann 1978) and economic
development, and perhaps for his satirical wit.
xvii  In his own voice:
“I came to MSU in 1956 with good institutionalist credentials:  C.E.Ayres at
Texas; Joseph Dorfman, Karl Polanyi, Ragnar Nurkse, and Carter Goodrich at Columbia;
Dudley Dillard and Alan Gruchy at Maryland.  My doctoral dissertation compared the
work of Thorstein Veblen and Joseph Schumpeter, finding both partly right and partly
wrong.
Apart from three sections of Principles in the four-course load at MSU, I was
expected to teach intermediate courses in macroeconomics, history of thought, European
recovery, and economic development.  The last had been a course in US economic
history, but I changed it to one about “underdeveloped countries,” as they were then
called.  The first textbooks were appearing and I used one by W. Arthur Lewis.  In the
1950s doctrinaire mathematical general equilibrium fanatics were minor irritants mainly
confined to the University of Chicago. Most economists at MSU and elsewhere were a
heterogeneous lot solving problems in a partial equilibrium way.  We institutionalists
thought our mission was to put some depth and structure into all that busywork.  For one
thing, technology was ignored by everyone as exogenous.  For another, cultural factors
and emotional conditioning were ignored in the role of tastes and property distribution.
We stressed that objective functioning efficiency, not relativistic subjective utility, should
determine policy. With some engineering background, many of us actually knew more
mathematics than the average, so we liked Harrod-Domar growth models.
Until 1960 I continued dissertation-follow-up research on manufacturing
technology in American economic history and produced a book (Strassmann 1959) and a
few articles.  One (1962) suggested that consumption could have positive externalities as
well as the negative ones that Veblen pondered in The Theory of the Leisure Class.
Connoisseurs reinforce one another’s enjoyment of goods by exchanging views.  The arts
are best for that. Ayres didn’t think that this addition was needed.
My Columbia MA (1950) had compared organization of the US and Mexican
construction industries, so moving into the burgeoning development field was not all that
surprising. The field hadn’t existed before, but my stress had been on international trade,
economic geography, and economic history – the three pillars of development.  We soon
had a second-term undergraduate development course that focused on policy.  Three
other courses specialized on Asia, Africa, and Latin America.  Around 1960 the time had
come for graduate courses.  I was in charge of organizing a year-long sequence.  The first
term stressed economic institutions; the second, growth models or secular change --
capital formation and population; and the third, fairly short-run policies.  The syllabus for
the first course had a very institutionalist introduction:16
“The less developed a society is, the greater is not only poverty but economic
misinformation, uncertainty, insecurity, and fantasy.  Rigid (hence intermittently
unstable) economic institutions are the result.  Economic development is a contest
between forces tending to perpetuate rigidities, often in disguised form, and forces
that raise flexibility and productivity.  The process is complex and the outcome
uncertain, but at its center are incentives to produce and to accept information and
the management of uncertainty.”
Within that framework, behavior in non-industrial societies, modernizing the labor force,
urbanization, entrepreneurship, market institutions, and government planning were
discussed.  After I retired in 1995, MSU went to a semester system and neither of the
resulting courses had such an institutional framework.  Moreover, graduate students now
are mostly Asians who are not as taken by such issues as were the do-gooder Peace Corps
of past years.
Of the students who wrote dissertations with me, about half were American and
half foreign.  Some used American data, but most used foreign data -- usually collected
by fieldwork, and one was an American-Mexican comparison. Dilmus James, who wrote
about capital formation with used equipment, became President of the Association for
Evolutionary Economics.  Ridha Ferchiou developed a stock-user matrix for housing
analysis and became Director of the Tunisian School of Business and Minister of
Education.
My research moved from the analysis of technological change in manufacturing
to that in construction.  Funding agencies were especially interested in employment
effects. Once I organized a meeting in Geneva on the spread of computers and
automation in poor countries. I spent some years on the rise and characteristics of large
international construction contractors of a dozen countries. With fieldwork I mainly
investigated housing issues such as the role of self-help, industrial prefabrication,
turnover of old housing, residential mobility, home-based enterprises, density of
settlement, land prices, and housing indicators.  Such research was funded by the Ford
Foundation, the World Bank, the Agency for International Development, the
International Labor Organization, and others.  It led to seven books, over a hundred
papers, and to participation in some thirty-two international conferences.  Much of the
work was a blend of institutional and conventional economic techniques.
Occasionally I would write a general article on this or that topic, inevitably
showing my institutionalist Dewey-Veblen perspective.  Most likely, however, I was
more conservative than my institutionalist colleagues.  Contrary to Veblen, I had found
that American innovative manufacturing entrepreneurs in the nineteenth century were
creative, not just parasitic on inventors.  Schumpeter, however, overstated their heroic
risk taking.  Fieldwork in Mexico had shown me that private enterprises were more
reliable and efficient than public firms that were supposed to be yardsticks.  Much
propaganda from the likes of the National Association of Manufacturers irritatingly
turned out to be true after all!  For Warren Samuels’ The Chicago School of Political
Economy, I wrote “Development Economics from a Chicago Perspective, (Strassmann
1976)” reviewing works of Jacob Viner, Larry Sjastaad, Arnold Harberger, Milton
Friedman, and others.  Unlike Samuels’ other contributors, I did not disagree with the
Chicago preference of markets over planning.  I merely thought that productive market
behavior was not instinctive and automatic but was something that had to be learned in a17
proper institutional framework.  Joseph Stiglitz’s keynote address to the 2000 World
Conference on Development Economics suggests that this view has come to prevail.”
Steve Woodbury (Wisconsin 1981) like many labor economists is a non-self-conscious
institutionalist.  Woodbury puts it this way:
“Apart from a couple of papers in JEI (Woodbury 1993) (Woodbury 1987), it isn't clear
that what I do would be classified as institutional economics. Although I would like to
think that I am a follower (or practitioner) of the Wisconsin Idea and of "looking and
seeing," this doesn't seem to be "institutional economics" as defined by the reigning
Institutionalists.  (Note: In the above articles, Woodbury explores the role of culture in
human capital and the role of power in labor markets.)
The paper on "Economics, Economists, and Public Policy" (Woodbury 2000) was
my presidential address to the Midwest Economics Association, and admonishes
economists for being too academic and not getting into the world and working on
problems that matter. Several projects I have worked on and am working on make use of
randomized trials to evaluate the effects of job search assistance or a reemployment
bonus. A project that I finished last year used random audits of denied unemployment
insurance claims in five pilot states to assess the accuracy of benefit denials. (It turns out
that 10 to 15 percent of all benefit denials are wrongful, and the Labor Department is
implementing a national program to track the extent of wrongful denials.)
Regarding teaching, I have tried in both undergraduate and graduate courses to
take policy issues and government programs as a starting point, then try to show that
economics can be useful (sometimes) in understanding programs and designing better
ones. It has been a difficult way to go, especially at the undergraduate level, because it
means putting together my own materials rather than relying on one or another textbook
and/or text supplements. Also, it has never been clear to me that more than a handful of
the students (or my colleagues, for that matter) understand what I am trying to do or how
it differs from a graduate student teaching from a garden-variety text.” A recent syllabus
from the undergraduate labor course that Woodbury teaches regularly can be seen at
<http://www.msu.edu/user/schmid/instecon/courses/woodbury.htm>
Nicholas Mercuro is the newest institutionalist to join the MSU faculty (1997). He is a
former student of Samuels (Ph.D. 1977) and coauthor with him (Samuels and Mercuro
1979) and (Mercuro and Samuels 1999).  Mercuro works in environmental economics
and surveys schools of thought in law and economics.  He argues in his book with
another MSU grad, Steven Medema, Economics and the Law: From Posner to Post-
Modernism, that there is a distinct institutional school of law and economics (Mercuro
and Medema 1997).  Mercuro’s appointment at MSU allows him to teach wherever he
pleases and that pleasure has manifested itself in the undergraduate James Madison
College where he has taught the economics of “Legal Relationships in Comparative
Perspective” and a course in law and economics in MSU’s Detroit College of Law.  He
also does work in environmental economics (Mercuro 1997).  For his vita see
http://www.msu.edu/user/mercuro/vita.htm
Others on the economics faculty with complementary interests to the institutionalists
were Milton Taylor (1954 Wisconsin Ph.D. under Harold Groves) in public finance,
Subbiah Kannappan in labor and economic development, Charles Larrowe in labor18
economics, and Daniel Fusfeld (Ph.D. Columbia 1953) in political economy (Fusfeld
1999) at MSU 1956-60.  Samuels and Schmid contributed to Fusfeld's festschrift entitled
Borderlands of Economics (Fusfeld, Aslanbeigui et al. 1997).  The Department had a
pluralist balance of institutionalists and neoclassicals until most of the above group
retired.  Still, the Department is today one of the few that require its Ph.D. students to
take history of economic thought.
The Spartan Group
Collaboration and mutual stimulation were a hallmark of the institutional
economics faculty at MSU.  Samuels, Schmid and Shaffer wrote a number of papers
together (Samuels, Schmid et al. 1994) and with Woodbury (Samuels, Schmid et al.
1984).  The collaboration perhaps reached its peak with the Spartan Group that met
periodically in each other’s homes to discuss a paper in draft by one of the members or
on a topic or article of mutual interest.  Members of the group included Samuels, Schmid,
Shaffer, Solo, and Woodbury.  Dan Saks (Ph.D. Princeton 1953) was a member for a few
years before he left for Vanderbilt in 1982.  It was by coincidence that the last names of
all but one member began with the letter “S” and earned their bread from State.  The
group was active for over a decade from about 1982 to 1997.  Each host prepared
refreshment for the group, but the fare became lighter with less use of spirits (but no less
spirited) as the group grew older.
Reproduction
Historians familiar with the founders of institutionalism assert that they did not
reproduce themselves, which contributed to the decline of institutionalism after World
War II (Morgan and Rutherford 1998) (Samuels 1998).
xviii  The Spartan School may yet
prove to be an exception.  With the variety of institutionalist perspectives and
applications to draw upon, MSU students had a richer diet than that available at most
other universities.  Students in Agricultural Economics made more use of institutional
courses in economics than economics students used courses in other departments.  That
might be expected given the dominance of the neoclassical paradigm in economics.
When students are being trained to teach standard courses (“horses for courses”), they do
not have time to explore alternative paradigms.  Students in the Department of
Economics were not encouraged to reach out.  Some of the outstanding MSU students
who carry on the institutional perspective include: Phillip Wandschneider, Washington
State University (Wandschneider 1986); George McDowell, Virginia Polytechnic
Institute (McDowell 2001); Josef Broder, University of Georgia (Broder 1981); David
Schweikhardt, Michigan State University; Steven Medema, University of Denver
(Medema 1998); Nicholas Mercuro, University of New Orleans who returned to MSU’s
faculty in 1997 (see above); Larry Hamm, Michigan State University; Alfredo Cadenas,
Autonomous University of Madrid (Cadenas 1989); Jouni Pavola, University of East
Anglia (Paavola and Samuels 1996); John Staatz, Michigan State University; Dilmus
James, University of Texas El Paso and former president of AFEE; Wesley Peterson,
University of Nebraska (Peterson 2001), Thomas Jayne, MSU Food Security Project
(Jayne, Yamano et al. 2001),  Steve Cooke, University of Idaho; Keith Bryant, Cornell;19
Hugh Spall, Central Washington University (Spall 1978); James Sterns, University of
Florida; Rodney Stevenson, University of Wisconsin and former president of AFEE
(Stevenson 2002); and Judith Stallmann, Texas A & M (Stallmann and Schmid 1987).
Like students of Commons, many MSU grads were specialists, such as Ronald Faas,
Washington State, and Phillip Favero, University of Maryland, who were both awarded
an Outstanding Extension Award by the Farm Foundation in 1999 for their public policy
work.
Graduates were also leaders in government and business as illustrated by Gary
Seevers who was a member of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and a
member of the President’s Council of Economic Advisors and later a partner with
Goldman Sachs.  Charles Reimenschnieder was Chief of Staff of the Senate Agriculture
Committee and the FAO Representative for North America.  Lynn Daft was President
Kennedy’s Special Assistant for Agriculture.  Michel Petit was head of the agricultural
section of the World Bank and professor l’INA Paris Grignon, France.  Douglas Headly
was head of Agriculture Canada and a major figure in formation of agricultural policy in
Canada.  Jerry Trant replaced John Hannah as head of the World Food Board.  Werner
Kiene played a major role in the World Food Program of the Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations.  Robert Loube was a member of the Federal
Communications Task Force on Universal Service.
Troublemakers with Unsafe Ideas
Institutional economists at MSU, as elsewhere, created problems for
administrators because of what was occasionally seen as unsafe ideas that irritated
powerful clients (Bronfrenbrenner 1985) 14.  Samuels observes that status emulation led
many to the judgment that “nothing should be associated with economics that would
render it suspect either as science or in the world of affairs (Samuels 1998) 183.”  Unsafe
ideas cost one MSU institutionalist approval of his thesis.  Several in Agricultural
Economics ran afoul of “the suspect status of anything smacking of support for labor
unionism and ‘socialism’.”  Mention has already been made above of several calls for
dismissal of faculty.  Fortunately, the MSU administrators supported academic freedom.
Several programs also came under attack.  The Rural Manpower Center in the
Department of Agricultural Economics under the leadership of Dan Sturt brought in
Ceaser Chavez who organized migrant workers in California agriculture.   Several
legislators objected and tried to kill the whole program, but the educational value of
diverse opinions was defended by Dean Cowden.  While some attacked, there was also
political and monetary support for problem solving analysis and outreach.  Several
institutionally oriented economists including Charles Killingsworth (Wisconsin 1947)
were active in the School of Labor and Industrial Relations.  An earlier version of the
school was seen as too pro-labor by the Michigan Chamber of Commerce who tried to
kill the program.  MSU President John Hannah saved it.
While reference has been made to vested interests calling for dismissal of faculty
and cancellation of programs, there was also positive feedback from the broader
environment that affected the evolution of programs.  For example, Elton Smith, long-
time President of the Michigan Farm Bureau, understood that a university was a place for
exploration of ideas even when he objected to some of the specific ones.  The evolution20
of institutional thought is not simply inside the brains of faculty, but is interdependent
with its environment.  Periodic supper seminars involving staff of the Farm Bureau and
agricultural economics faculty kept open the lines of communication and education.
(years?)  MSU being in the state capital facilitated interaction among faculty, politicians,
and interest groups.  Institutional economists are useful problem solvers and this was
appreciated by citizen groups and thus by university administrators.
Conclusion
A reading of the above biographies illustrates some of the major themes
emphasized in institutional economics (echoing and rephrasing the themes that Samuels
noted above as defining institutionalism for him):
1.  Evolution and role of learning: Samuels, Schmid, Shaffer, Strassmann.
2.  Cognitive science and role of beliefs: Shaffer, Solo, Schmid, Samuels.
3.  Disequilibria: Samuels, Schmid, Johnson.
4.  Property rights: Many, if not all.
5.  Less apologia for current institutions as efficient; rather active in imagining
new institutions and helping others establish them: Larzalere, Ulrey, Shaffer,
Schmid, Harvey, Hamm, Weber.
6.  Land and public utilities: Barlowe, Schmid, Trebing, Batie, Mercuro, Norris.
7.  Industrial organization and market organization: Shaffer, Adams, Trebing,
Schmid, Solo.
8.  Sense of history of thought and economy: Samuels, Schmid, Barlowe.
9.  Technology and science policy: Solo, Strassmann, Schmid, Bonnen.
10. Methodology: Samuels, Solo, Schmid, Johnson.
11. Law and economics: Samuels, Mercuro, Schmid,.
12. Power, class, gender, poverty, income distribution: Samuels, Schmid, Shaffer,
Moser, Bonnen, Strassmann.
13. Labor—not an ordinary commodity: Woodbury, Kannappan, Moser, Sturt.
14. Troublemakers and unsafe ideas: Many.
Warren Samuels (Samuels 2000) (312) has argued, “Institutionalism is
heterogeneous.  There is no single school of thought at the level of particular doctrines—
though there is a common orientation or set of coordinate themes.”  And he implies that it
is a good thing too.  The history of heterodox thinking and teaching at MSU supports his
contention.  It benefited from lines of thought rooted in Commons, Ayres, (others) which
evolved in the hands of this group of faculty who enjoyed the stimulation of each other’s
thoughts.  It remains for others to judge whether it constituted a vital center of
institutional economics unrivaled in the world during the last half of the 20
th century.
The evidence suggests that there was heterodoxy within institutionalism at MSU.
It was not a doctrinaire place, and the Department of Agricultural Economics is still
pluralistic.  This may have been a strength in the training of good economists, but it is
probably a weakness in terms of the history of thought despite the considerable body of
work of MSU’s faculty.  MSU’s lack of brand identity may prevent its being known as a
distinctive Spartan School of Institutional Economics.21
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Endnotes
i All of the autobiographical direct quotes were provided to the author during the fall, 2001. Details on
agricultural economics courses can be found at http://www.aec.msu.edu/agecon/history/teaching.htm#grad1
The longevity of institutional economists was noted by Oliver Williamson referring to such as Ronald
Coase and Douglass North.  The same could be said of those at MSU, with all of those referenced here still
living at the end of 2001, save four. Oliver Williamson, unpublished speech to the annual meeting of the
American Agricultural Economics Association, Toronto, Canada, July 27, 1997, as recalled by A. Allan
Schmid.
ii Henry Larzalere, conversation with the author, December 26, 2001.26
                                                                                                                                                
iii Larzalere, Ulrey, and Motts made contributions to institutional change and new organizations more than
to institutional theory.
iv Shaffer and several colleagues obtained funding for a Latin American Market Planning Center to research
the role of marketing in economic development.  “The long-held belief that effective marketing systems
will evolve automatically is at best dubious.  Since it is widely recognized that farmers and industrialists
must be educated, motivated, assisted and sometime subsidized to encourage the necessary innovation to
promote development, there is no apparent reason to expect market intermediaries (or more accurately,
marketing system firms) to be any different.  In fact, our evidence suggests that at some stage public
agency efforts to stimulate markets may become crucial to development Harrison, K., D. Henley, et al.
(1974). Improving Food Marketing Systems In Developing Countries: Experiences From Latin America.
East Lansing, Latin American Studies Center, Michigan State University: 135..”
v MSU was a latecomer to the granting of the Ph.D. in agricultural economics with three degrees being
granted between 1927 and 1930 Gans, A. R., O. Vopelius, et al. (1930). "Candidates for the Doctors's
Degree in Agricultural Economics in American Universities and Colleges, 1929-30." Journal of Farm
Economics 12(1): 498-22..  The leading universities were Cornell, Minnesota, Wisconsin and Harvard.
vi The Department has averaged about 38 tenure-stream faculty from the late 1970’s to the present.
vii An external review team commented, “There is, however, adequate intellectual tension among faculty
members to stimulate thought and discussion.” Final Report of External Review Team, October 21, 1986.
viii In 1965 the course was entitled “Emergence, Concepts, and Setting of Agricultural Economics.”  The
course description: “Historical and institutional development of agricultural economics.  Central concepts
and interrelations of sub-fields.  Political-economic setting of agriculture and the role of agricultural
economists.”
ix “A prevailing principle guiding evaluation and restructuring of the Ph.D. program was the desire by
faculty to retain much of the flexibility in structure and opportunity that has characterized the Michigan
State University Agricultural Economics program.  The MSU philosophy has been to encourage the
student, major professor and guidance committee to design a program unique to that students’ needs and
preferences with overall expectation that students gain exposure to the full scope of the field.” “It is
recognized that competence in Agricultural Economics requires firsthand knowledge of and experience
with technologies, institutions, business and people involved in agricultural and/or natural resources.
Additional courses or experience may be required by the guidance committee to remedy deficiencies in
such knowledge.”  Materials prepared for the Comprehensive Review of the Department of Agricultural
Economics, Sept. 8-11, 1986.  Graduate enrollment was 78 in 1960, peaked in 1975 at 126 and was 89 in
1986, about 60 percent domestic and 40 percent foreign.  There were 73 in 2001.
For a description of the agricultural economics undergraduate and graduate course program at
MSU, see Connor, L. J. (1973). "Michigan State's Curricula in Agricultural Economics." American Journal
of Agricultural Economics 55(4): 752-4..  This journal issue contains descriptions of other departments for
comparison.
x Larry Hamm, conversation with the author, January 7, 2002.
xi Johnson also understood that decisions of the typical farm firm with the family and several generations
constituted a variety of public choice.
xii  Glenn L. Johnson, conversation with the author, January 29, 2002.
xiii Johnson points out that Knight’s book, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, provided a place for management in
economics theory that had been ignored before.  Reductionist (deterministic) models had no place for
management where learning (rather than perfect knowledge) is appropriate.27
                                                                                                                                                
xiv Glenn L. Johnson, conversation with the author, January 29, 2002.
xv Peterson with Schmid taught an experimental AEC 800, Foundations of Agricultural Economics, 1997-
99.  It was designed as a basic theory course for master’s students seeking a career in business
management.  It combined theory of the firm with institutional economics and organization theory.
xvi David Friday’s tenure as president was limited to one year before he left for the New School For Social
Research.  “Friday had not satisfied the farm groups which brought him here to reorient extension and
experimental work from production to marketing.  Believing that agricultural prices were governed by
international marketing conditions, he told farm audiences that little could be accomplished by efforts to
replace the middleman with cooperatives Kuhn, M. (1955). Michigan State: The First Hundred Years. East
Lansing, Michigan State University Press. 284.”
xvii Strassmann in his review of the Spartan Group section of this paper suggested, “why not drop
mentioning that people's names begin with "S."  Truly, so what?   I'm also Leo the Lion in the Zodiac.
What are you?  Moreover, give a hint that it must strike some readers as ironic that we are associated with a
university that has "Spartan" as an identity.  Don't most people associate Sparta with extreme rigid
doctrinaire militarism, the very opposite of what institutionalists stand for?  Can an institutionalist really be
proud to be labeled a ‘Spartan’?   Why not PruSSian?  Or just plain SS?  Insitutionalists of all people
should show a sense of history and language.”
xviii Warren Samuels (1998, 192) offers the judgment that “There was only one Commons and as time
passed he did not reproduce himself.”  This author would like to be on record as predicting that when
enough time has elapsed to put Commons and Samuels in perspective, it will be seen that Commons was
more than reproduced in Samuels.